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The challenge is balancing support for the warfighter in an era of persistent con-
flict, where good-enough solutions are needed in months, weeks, or better yet,
tomorrow, with an entirely different dynamic for conventional and strategic pro-
grams, which can take many years to achieve the desired level of technological
overmatch. Reconciling these two paradigms is one of the most vexing chal-
lenges facing our military institutions.1
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
“Vexing” is certainly the right word to describe the state of resource allocation
in the national security community. Despite still sizable defense budgets,2 seri-
ous economic constraints3 combine with a wide range of complicated threats to
create extremely difficult choices for policy makers. To help them work through
the decision-making process, Congress mandates Quadrennial Defense Re-
views (QDRs).4 QDRs “are intended to guide the services in making resource
allocation decisions when developing future budgets.”5
The 2010 QDR rightly insists that “America’s interests and role in the world
require armed forces with unmatched capabilities.”6 Recent resource decisions,
however, do not provide much comfort for those who believe that the high-tech
equipment—to include especially advanced airpower7—provides the most effi-
cient, effective, and flexible means of addressing the most dangerous security
challenges of the twenty-first century.
Indeed, this essay argues that such forces are deserving of stronger resource
support than is currently the case. It contends that misapprehensions of key
issues—reflected in the QDR and elsewhere—are eroding the United States’
“unmatched” capabilities, at least insofar as the air and space domains are
concerned.
Assessing Risk
An (and perhaps “the”) essential issue of defense planning is the proper assess-
ment of risks. Appropriately, the QDR says that “risk management is central to
effective decision-making and is vital to our success.”8 The 2008 National De-
fense Strategy (NDS)9 properly defines risk “in terms of the potential for dam-
age to national security combined with the probability of occurrence and a
measurement of the consequences should the underlying risk remain unad-
dressed.”10 The reference to “consequences” is key because, as one expert puts
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it, a “probability factor tells us nothing about risk until coupled with a
consequence.”11
However, the NDS, the QDR, and other government pronouncements
make it clear that probability is the defining factor underpinning resource allo-
cation. For example, the NDS claims that “[f]or the foreseeable future, [the stra-
tegic] environment will be defined by a global struggle against a violent
extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international system.”12 The grav-
ity of the potential consequences garners markedly less attention.
The QDR (and other expressions of contemporary defense thinking) rarely
focus on the implications of the differences between serious threats and truly
existential ones. While we may be in an era of persistent conflict, that circum-
stance is more usual than unusual as there have been fewer than a hundred
years in the last ten thousand when there “has not been armed conflict some-
place.”13 Moreover, the nature of today’s “persistent” conflicts are generally
low-intensity, “irregular” wars.14 Although “insurgencies, civil wars and terrorist
acts are always more common than large-scale interstate wars,” says analyst
William Hawkins, are such conflicts, he asks, the “kind of warfare the United
States needs to fight?”15
Of course, no one wants to see a repeat of the terrible events of 9/11, when
a group of nonstate actors murdered over three thousand Americans. But to
what degree should vicious acts by nonstate actors define defense resource al-
location? Consider that in the years since the 9/11 tragedy over one hundred
thousand Americans were murdered by other nonstate actors (typically com-
mon criminals).16
No doubt terrorism is a crucial concern, but risk-management experts John
Mueller and Mark G. Stewart conclude from a survey of many studies that the
risk of terrorism is “hardly existential” and is, in fact, “so low that spending fur-
ther to reduce its likelihood or consequences is scarcely justified.”17 Although
they understand the political pressure on policy makers, Mueller and Stewart
maintain it does not relieve leaders “of their responsibility to expend public
funds wisely [or] to inform the public about the risk that terrorism actually pre-
sents.”18 Regrettably, the QDR provides no such information.
Terrorism involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is certainly a
special concern. However, experts believe the chances of terrorists successfully
using a nuclear weapon are “vanishingly small.”19 In any event, neither of “to-
day’s wars”20 in Iraq and Afghanistan that are devouring defense resources are
direct counters to that threat. In fact, the evidence shows that Iraq’s WMD
dreams ended in 1998 with Operation Desert Fox’s air strikes.21 Concerning Af-
ghanistan, Professor Andrew Bacevich argued in late 2008, that—ironically—
the “chief effect of military operations [there] has been to push radical Islamists
across the Pakistan border . . . contributing to the destabilization” of that
nuclear-armed country.22
Regardless, even assuming such a dreadful scenario could occur, the
United States would still survive. Only a nation-state possessing numerous
WMDs and effective delivery vehicles could have the resources to stage an at-
tack of sufficient dimensions to put the survival of the United States in jeopardy.
In that respect, IIan Berman of the American Foreign Policy Council warns that
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“practically every nuclear weapon state is engaged in a serious modernization
of its strategic arsenal” while the United States’ continues to “atrophy.”23
Nonetheless, the QDR very decidedly gives priority to the nonexistential
threat of terrorism. Declaring that the “epicenter of the terrorist threat to the
United States is rooted in Afghanistan and Pakistan,”24 the QDR’s top objective
is to “prevail in today’s wars.”25 Operations in Afghanistan (and Iraq) will, the
QDR informs, “substantially determine the size and shape of major elements of
U.S. military forces for several years.”26 That will be the case because to
perform those operations, the United States has selected the very manpower-
intensive and largely low-tech approach set forth in the Army and Marine
Corps’s Counterinsurgency (COIN), Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24).27
The Impact of FM 3-24
Introduced in 2006, FM 3-24 is largely the product of analysis of Cold War–era
COIN conflicts.28 Airpower technology of that period had little to offer counter-
insurgents, so FM 3-24 does not internalize fully what today’s aerial platforms
can provide in terms of persistent surveillance and precision strike. This is un-
fortunate because their impact on contemporary operations is so dramatic that
retired Army general Barry McCaffrey insists that the very nature of warfare has
been “fundamentally changed.”29
Instead of reflecting that fundamental change, the doctrine actually margin-
alizes airpower into a five-page annex that itself discourages its kinetic use.30 In
fairness, FM 3-24 seems to disdain the use of force generally. Indeed, Steven
Coll wrote in the New Yorker that
[FM 3-24 is popular] among sections of the country’s liberal-minded intelligent-
sia. This was warfare for northeastern graduate students—complex, blended
with politics, designed to build countries rather than destroy them, and fash-
ioned to minimize violence. It was a doctrine with particular appeal to people
who would never own a gun.31
As such, FM 3-24 acquired a public persona as being a “softer approach
that won allies” after it was implemented in Iraq in 2007.32 Deriding the notion
of “killing and capturing” insurgents, advocates of FM 3-24 see it as being all
about winning “hearts and minds.” In truth, killing and capturing played a deci-
sive role in pacifying Iraq in 2007.
Notwithstanding the “surge” of U.S. troops, it took the incarceration of tens
of thousands of Iraqis33 and a fivefold increase in air strikes to produce
success.34 And those air strikes involved a lot of killing;35 one source even
claimed that “90% of the terrorists [who were] killed [were] killed by
airpower.”36
Furthermore, it appears that FM 3-24’s reputed “softer” approach actually
won few hearts for U.S. forces. Despite the increased security, a 2008 survey of
Iraqis found that 61 percent still believed that the presence of U.S. forces made
security worse in their country, and of those who thought the security was im-
proved, only 4 percent believed U.S. forces deserved the most credit.37
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Resource Implications
The extension of FM 3-24’s approach to Afghanistan has profound resource
implications for the whole armed forces. Specifically, implementing it requires
expensive deployments of considerable numbers of ground forces. For exam-
ple, the doctrine calls for a “minimum troop density” of twenty counterinsur-
gents per one thousand residents.38 Because FM 3-24 envisions COIN as
overwhelmingly the province of soldiers and Marines,39 both services have
grown significantly to support the doctrine.40 The Army alone is due to swell its
ranks to 569,000 active-duty soldiers.41
The perception that ground forces are “stressed . . . disproportionately” by
“multiple combat tours” drives the manpower increase.42 The facts are, how-
ever, more complicated because the COIN doctrine requires a special kind of
troop. Quoting COIN expert David Galula, FM 3-24 says the “soldier must be
prepared to become . . . a social worker, a civil engineer, a school teacher, a
nurse, a boy scout.”43
This creates a difficult challenge for the Army because relatively few service
personnel are suitable for these diverse, graduate-level roles. Although more
than 50,000 soldiers have deployed three or more times, it is also true that
nearly 237,000 soldiers in the active-duty Army have never deployed, and of
the 310,000 who have, nearly 155,000 of those have only deployed once.44
Only a small percentage of the Army can be said to be genuinely overstressed.
The expense of this additional manpower is staggering. Personnel costs
generally are rising so radically that Pentagon officials recently told the Wash-
ington Post that the Department of Defense (DoD) was facing “fiscal calamity”
because the “government’s generosity [toward military personnel] is unsustain-
able.”45 Additionally, the price tag of deploying troops to “today’s wars” is also
rising rapidly; the cost of sending just one soldier to Afghanistan is now about
$1 million.46
Such expenditures inevitably leave DoD “with less money to buy weap-
ons.”47 Spending on personnel “eats away” at the ability to develop and ac-
quire sufficient numbers of the high-tech weaponry upon which airpower is
especially dependent.48 Predictably, the Air Force has been a target for budget
cutters for some time,49 and the effects are showing. Today’s Air Force is in-
creasingly geriatric by warplane standards: its F-15 fighters average twenty-five
years old, KC-135 tankers average forty-seven years of service, and the typical
B-52 bomber will celebrate its forty-eighth birthday this year.50
Although the QDR repeatedly expresses concern about potential adversar-
ies fielding antiaccess capabilities,51 the production of the Air Force’s premier
counter to that challenge—the F-22—was terminated. In acquiescing to cap-
ping the program at 187 fighters, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley and
chief of staff General Norton Schwartz both acknowledged that the Air Force
had previously concluded that a 243-aircraft F-22 fleet “would be a moderate-
risk force.”52 They agreed to the lower number mainly due to “zero-sum” bud-
get pressures.53
Some believe the acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) obviates
the need for the F-22. Actually, many airmen consider the F-22 a much more
capable aircraft, especially because of its “less advertised capabilities as an
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airborne command and control node, an intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance sensor package and information warfare weapon.”54 Furthermore,
Aviation Week quoted Brigadier General Peter Pawling of the Hawaii National
Guard in the summer of 2009 as saying:
It’s just that the F-35 and F-22 are such different airplanes. . . . There are those
who think you can simply build more F-35s. . . . But the F-22 is one of those
once-in-a-lifetime airplanes. . . . If we had a major conflict [against someone
with advanced air defenses], I can’t imagine going in there with anything but an
F-22.55
In a 2009 letter to Senator Saxby Chambliss, the then commander of Air
Combat Command, General John Corley, insisted that there were “no studies”
to justify the 187 figure.56 In his judgment, 187 F-22s was a “high risk” number.
The Christian Science Monitor reported that in response Air Force officials sim-
ply said that the “service must spend more of its limited resources on remote
controlled aircraft—used heavily in today’s wars.”57
This illustrates one of the Air Force’s main quandaries. As Vice Admiral Wil-
liam R. Burke wrote in Proceedings, the Air Force and Navy must serve as the
nation’s “strategic reserve” against “high-end competitors” armed with high-
tech weaponry, yet at the same time provide full support to “today’s wars.”58
Parenthetically, it is not lost on airpower supporters concerned about high-end
threats that Secretary Gates is adamant that “any major weapons program, to
remain viable, will have to show some utility and relevance to . . . irregular [war-
fare] campaigns.”59
When the decision was made to end the production of F-22s, Air Force
leaders conceded that “[m]uch rides on the F-35’s success.”60 This is especially
so since the Air Force is retiring some 250 fighters to pay for the JSF.61 Now,
however, the F-35’s development is troubled by “delays and cost overruns”
that have raised the price tag of each airplane to $95 million.62 This spurs some
analysts to advocate reviving production of the F-22 and scrapping the JSF.63
They believe that the F-22 is significantly more capable than the F-35, and that
only the F-22 can compete against sophisticated air defenses and fifth-generation
fighters such as Russia’s Sukhoi T-50.64
Even so, the QDR’s plan for the Air Force follows its overall preference for
flowing resources toward fighting the low-tech, nonstate actors of “today’s
wars.” For that reason, it calls for eight intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (ISR) wing-equivalents composed primarily of remotely manned aerial
vehicles and associated personnel.65 Although proliferated throughout the
armed forces,66 such systems have limited utility outside low-tech, low-threat
conflicts. According to published reports, remotely manned systems able to op-
erate in contested environments may be years away.67
To the extent defense spending is a “zero-sum” enterprise, the “opportu-
nity cost” of the current allocations of defense resources is real. Although the
“seeds” of the next-generation bomber are in the current budget proposal,68
those who consider the need for an advanced manned penetrating bomber as
indispensable to the nation’s security69 may be disturbed by vice chairman
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General James Cartwright’s very recent comments that seem to question its rel-
evance given “the wars we’re in.”70
Air Force leaders are beginning to discuss publicly the consequences of
resource decisions on capabilities. In a January 2010 speech, General
Schwartz candidly warned of the growing vulnerability of the satellite Global
Positioning System (GPS).71 Additionally, Congress was recently told that
“the U.S.’s current aerial refueling capacity is as much as 20 percent shy of
what could be needed in major conflict.”72
What is more is that as U.S. ground forces have grown, America’s Air Force
continues to shrink in an effort to save money for modernization73—it will soon
be its smallest size since its inception in 1947. To deal with reduced manpower,
as well as overtaxed resources, General Schwartz announced that “calibrated
ambition” was his “theme” for the reshaped Air Force.74 As he put it, the Air
Force “won’t be able to do all its assigned tasks as comprehensively as it once
did.”75 According to General Schwartz, the Air Force “will be aiming for simple
sufficiency in areas where it’s been accustomed to dominance.”76
Dr. Daniel Goure of the Lexington Institute says that General Schwartz’s
“words imply a willingness to cede at least a measure of air dominance to po-
tential adversaries such as Russia or China” even though, he says, the lesson of
“modern wars is that without dominance of the air the ability to project power
forward, particularly on land, is at risk.”77 Moreover, it now appears that the
Chinese will be fielding a fifth-generation fighter “in the ballpark” with the F-22
by 2018, significantly sooner than many anticipated.78
Nevertheless, General Schwartz believes the “key” to meeting both irregu-
lar warfare and conventional conflict demands is to leverage and adapt existing
capabilities.79 Although many air platforms are geared toward conventional
war, he believes they can be “tweak[ed] to meet irregular war requirements.”80
That may already be happening, as Inside the Air Force recently reported that
U.S. airmen have been using traditional capabilities creatively to solve the
“nuanced” problems of irregular war.81
Such creativity and flexibility may be exactly what is needed to more eco-
nomically and effectively address “today’s wars.” In Afghanistan, for example,
it is becoming increasingly clear that masses of foreign troops on the ground
may be counterproductive. As former Army chief of staff General John
Wickham said in late 2008, “[l]arge military forces alienate local populations,
succeed less and cost more.”82
Last September Time Magazine gave this blunt assessment: “The Afghan
insurgency is not a cohesive movement but rather a loose affiliation of groups
united by a common goal: the expulsion of foreign troops.”83 Thus, “surging”
troops into Afghanistan may well exacerbate, not solve, the COIN problem
there.84
A recent RAND report raises problems that are even more troubling. Enti-
tled How Insurgencies End, it makes a number of relevant observations.85 In
particular, it notes that modern insurgencies last approximately ten years, and
that is clearly a problem for U.S. policy makers because even Secretary Gates
believes that “Americans will not accept a ‘long slog’ in Afghanistan.”86
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In addition, although supportive of “Iraq-style” COIN,87 the RAND study
nevertheless concedes that “anocracies” (which it defines as “a particularly
weak form of government in that it is good at neither democracy nor autoc-
racy”) win only about 15 percent of all COIN contests.88 Given that the Afghan
government is widely viewed as weak and corrupt,89 this conclusion is ominous
indeed; some observers are already saying that the “surge in Afghanistan isn’t
working.”90
However, by adopting an “enemy-centric” strategy it may be possible to
devise a less resource-demanding solution.91 It would require reorienting the
current “people-centric” approach of “protect[ing] the Afghan” people from
the Taliban,92 to a more al Qaeda–centered effort. Though narrower in scope
than that to which FM 3-24 aspires, it still seems consistent with the president’s
“clear and focused goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda.”93 It is a
more flexible and adaptive response to an al Qaeda that may be able to rapidly
establish “epicenters” other than in Afghanistan.94
Focusing on al Qaeda does not require enmeshing a massive American
ground presence in a politicized and costly nation-building effort. However, it
also would not require abandoning all COIN efforts such as training indigenous
military and governmental personnel. True, it would put more emphasis on tra-
ditional military means in battling al Qaeda extremists, but that reorientation of
resources could pay COIN dividends.
Ralph Peters—a former Army officer considered by many to be an astute
military analyst—argues that history demonstrates that success in defeating in-
surgencies is “at least 90 percent a military mission.”95 Peters says that “[w]ell-
meaning generals insist that ‘we can’t kill our way out of an insurgency,’ even
though, historically, success against insurgents—especially counterrevolution-
aries seeking a religious restoration or ethnic supremacy—consistently required
killing them in substantial numbers.”96
Many experts have advocated airpower-oriented strategies aimed at fight-
ing al Qaeda “from afar.”97 This does not, however, mean ignoring the Taliban.
If the fear is that they will provide a home for a resurgent al Qaeda, we should
not assume FM 3-24’s “softer” approach is the only way to defeat them.
Edward Luttwak, the eminent security theorist, dissects the Israeli Gaza war
of 2008 and concludes that aerial bombing can work in irregular war.98 Luttwak
sardonically observes that given Afghanistan’s muddled history and politics,
even if General Stanley McChrystal executes a population-centric, nation-
building effort as the “sacrosanct Field Manual 3-24 prescribes,” it may still
need a “century or two” to work.99 According to Luttwak: “The better and
cheaper alternative would be to resurrect strategic bombing in a thoroughly
new way by arming the Taliban’s many enemies to the teeth and replacing U.S.
troops in Afghanistan with sporadic airstrikes. Whenever the Taliban concen-
trate in numbers to attack, they would be bombed.”100
He admits that it would be an “imperfect solution” but, he says, it “would
end the costly futility of ‘nation-building’ in a remote and unwelcoming
land.”101 Imperfect solutions, however, may be the best that can be achieved in
an austere funding environment.
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The Way Ahead
To reiterate, the QDR and other reflections of the defense establishment think-
ing foresee a future of persistent conflict, mainly focused in failed and failing
states. As this paper outlines, the current approach requires large numbers of
ground troops ready to win “hearts and minds” via nation-building and stability
operations (which DoD now puts on a par with combat operations).102 Thus, as
one observer puts it, “Iraq-style counterinsurgency is fast becoming the U.S.
Army’s organizing principle.”103 Resources are flowing accordingly; even the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs gushes that the “Army is the center of gravity for
the U.S. military.”104
However, the American people are evincing a growing aversion toward in-
volvement in another “Iraq-style” or, for that matter, “Afghan-style” operation.
Despite the relative success U.S. forces achieved in Iraq, 60 percent of Ameri-
cans still oppose the war.105 Likewise, the most recent poll of Americans regard-
ing Afghanistan shows that a majority now believes the war was “not worth
fighting.”106
Plainly, the American body politic has not shown any appetite for the very
kind of operation the QDR favors—and prioritizes resources to conduct. James
S. Corum—one of the authors of FM 3-24—points out that the loss of blood
and treasure in Iraq has dramatically eroded domestic American support for
similar operations.107 Accordingly, he says that it is unlikely that U.S. troops will
be involved with them in a major way in the future “no matter how necessary or
justified they might be.”108
Consider as well that as the United States grows the mass of its ground
forces in order to wage protracted, low-intensity conflicts against low-tech ad-
versaries, its most formidable potential opponent is doing just the opposite.
DoD’s own report to Congress about China’s military power reveals that “[t]he
People’s Liberation Army is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a
mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capa-
ble of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its pe-
riphery against high-tech adversaries—an approach that China refers to as
preparing for ‘local wars under conditions of informatization.’”109
The American people seems to understand instinctively the gravity of the
challenge that countries like China can present to vital U.S. interests. Perhaps
perceiving the limited relevance of ground forces to threats from high-tech ri-
vals, a 2009 poll found that the majority of the U.S. public believed that the Air
Force would be the “most important [service] to America” in future wars.110
Yet at the same time, the wisdom of diminishing the size of America’s
ground forces in an era of great uncertainty is questionable—and likely unnec-
essary. As is well documented, even at 4.7 percent of the gross domestic prod-
uct, that percentage for the defense budget is small as a wartime figure relative
to other periods in U.S. history.111 The looming internecine fights among the
services over budget need not take place—if the country truly recognizes it is at
war, and mobilizes accordingly.
Regardless, the fact remains that America is making choices that carry great
potential to erode the nation’s ability to enjoy air and space preeminence in ar-
eas of vital interest over the longer term. Such choices inevitably “provide
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incentives for [other countries] to build up where the U.S. is pulling back.”112
Objections to diminishing air capabilities, however, are rare and muted. Even
General Schwartz admits that there are few vocal airpower supporters in
Washington.113
At least in part, the absence of airpower advocates must be attributed to the
Air Force itself. Consider these comments from Under Secretary of Defense
Michèle Flournoy about the Air Force’s collective ennui:
During the 80s and early 90s, the Air Force was on the leading edge in innova-
tive strategic thinking within DoD, driving the development of new concepts of
operations and ways of war. The Air Force was the poster child for thought-
leadership in the Pentagon. But that has become less and less true, even though
we need such thinking more today than ever.114
In short, unless others become airpower’s champion, it is quite possible that
U.S. capabilities could decline to the point where an adversary could achieve
air superiority at least in a given theater, and perhaps even further. Some have
raised a cry: shortly before the F-22 program was terminated, author Mark
Bowden warned: “Now we have a choice. We can stock the Air Force with the
expensive, cutting edge F-22—maintaining our technological superiority at
great expense to our Treasury. Or we can go back to a time when the cost of air
supremacy was paid in blood of men. . . .”115
We know now what choice was made. Only time will tell the wisdom of that
“vexing” decision, as well as the prudence of forgoing airpower dominance in a
world where America’s most dangerous competitors relentlessly seek it.
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